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INTRODUCTION
Facing water scarcity and shortages, governments in developing nations
have turned to water privatization. ' Once implemented, however, water
privatization programs have overwhelmingly been met with public hostility and
6 ,2
"anti-privatization protests and riots." In some water privatizations, the
privatizers themselves have become bankrupt 3 or have failed to meet
investment and expansion targets.4
Similarly, while most privatizations are supposed to deliver Pareto
improvements-results "that make one party to a deal better off without
making another party worse off'5 - water privatizations have largely delivered
the opposite. Water privatizations have caused cholera outbreaks among
consumers, insurmountable costs for both consumers and privatizers,7 and
additional transaction costs for governments. 8 Despite such outcomes, the
World Bank still supports water privatization, 9 sometimes only lending to
countries if they privatize their water systems.'
0
Unlike the World Bank, scholars are cautious about water privatization's
potential. Even though water seems like the perfect target for privatization-
drinking water is a capital- and infrastructure-intensive industry" presumably
better managed by a private company than by a public entity-scholars largely
believe that privatization is unlikely to transform water and sanitation services
1. See Timothy O'Neill, Note, Water and Freedom: The Privatization of Water and Its
Implications for Democracy and Human Rights in the Developing World, 17 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L.
& POL'Y 357, 358 (2006).
2. Itzchak Komfeld, A Global Water Apartheid: From Revelation to Resolution, 43 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 701, 710-11 (2010); see Craig Anthony Arnold, Water Privatization Trends in the
United States: Human Rights, National Security, and Public Stewardship, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L.
& POL'Y REV. 785, 798 (2009); Chris Kraul, Protests Stymie Peru's Drive To Raise Capital, L.A.
TIMES, July 14, 2002, http://articles.latimes.com/2002/jul/14/business/fi-perul4 (illustrating the broader
point that privatizations have led to riots and populist backlash).
3. See Xun Wu & Nepomuceno A. Malaluan, A Tale of Two Concessionaires: A Natural
Experiment of Water Privatisation in Metro Manila, 45 URB. STUD. 207, 213-17 (2008).
4. See Water Privatization Fiascos: Broken Promises and Social Turmoil, PUB. CITIZEN 7
(Mar. 2003), http://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/doc/Fiascos.pdf.
5. John S. Brubaker, Note, A Realistic Critique of Freedom of Contract in Labor Law
Negotiations: Creating More Optimal and Just Outcomes, 5 WASH. U. JURISPRUDENCE REv. 107, 115
(2012); see also Ratl GonzAlez Pietrogiovanna, The Benefits of Privatization? The Mexican Experience
in the Telecommunications Industry 2 (unpublished manuscript), http://www.lse.ac.uk/europeanlnstitute
/events/2008-09/Gonzalez Pietrogiovanna.pdf (last visited Dec. 4, 2014).
6. See Jacques Pauw, The Politics of Underdevelopment: Metered to Death-How a Water
Experiment Caused Riots and a Cholera Epidemic, 33 INT'L J. HEALTH SERVICES 819 (2003).
7. See id. at 821-23, 829; Wu & Malaluan, supra note 3, at 217.
8. See Karen Bakker, Trickle Down? Private Sector Participation and the Pro-Poor Water
Supply Debate in Jakarta, Indonesia, 38 GEOFORUM 855, 860 (2007).
9. Group to World Bank: Stop Funding Water Privatization, GLOBAL POL'Y FORUM,
https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/98-links-and-resources/51513-group-to-world
-bank-stop-funding-water-privatization-.html (last updated Apr. 16, 2012).
10. Maude Barlow & Tony Clarke, Water Privatization, GLOBAL POL'Y FORUM,
https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/209/4339 8 .html (last updated Jan. 2004).
11. James Salzman, Thirst: A Short History of Drinking Water, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 94,
96 (2004).
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in the developing world. 12 Other scholars have studied the outcomes of specific
water privatizations, focusing their study on privatizations that have failed.
13
Several publications have discussed water privatization in terms of class
dynamics. Scholars, however, have yet to analyze how various factors-for
example, class dynamics, in tandem with other political and economic
factors-enable and/or hinder water privatizations from delivering Pareto
improvements. 14 Moreover, privatization experts have yet to critique
development banks' privatization policies 5 and have not addressed how
development banks can structure water privatizations to deliver Pareto
improvements.
This Note critiques development banks' privatization policies by
analyzing water privatizations in Bolivia, South Africa, and the Philippines.'
6
This Note analyzes each privatization across three factors-class dynamics,
business and deal structure, and political climate-to determine why certain
water privatization and development policies fail and why others succeed. The
majority of scholars have studied one of the three factors-class dynamics, 17
business and deal structure,' 8 or political climate19-in the context of a single
privatization, but have not conducted an in-depth analysis of all three factors in
the context of multiple privatizations.2 °
This Note makes three claims. First, water privatization programs are
highly unlikely to deliver Pareto improvements if privatizers charge
12. For example, Budds and McGranahan argue that water privatization is unlikely to be
relatively more effective than the status quo in the developing world. Jessica Budds & Gordon
McGranahan, Are the Debates on Water Privatization Missing the Point? Experiences from Africa, Asia,
and Latin America, 15 ENV'T & URBANIZATION 87 (2003).
13. See, e.g., OSCAR OLIVERA & TOM LEWIS, iCOCHABAMBA! WATER WAR IN BOLIVIA
(2004) (focusing on the shortcomings of the water privatization in Cochabamba, Bolivia); PUB. CITIZEN,
supra note 4 (describing several water privatization "fiascos").
14. See, e.g., OLIVERA & LEWIS, supra note 13; O'Neill, supra note 1, at 168. Several
scholars have focused their analysis on class dynamics and others have explored how business and deal
structure influence privatizations. See, e.g., Wu & Malaluan, supra note 3, at 213-17. None of these
publications, however, discuss how multiple factors influence water privatizations.
15. As mentioned above, development banks are usually pro-privatization. In particular, the
World Bank and IMF have conditioned the receipt of development loans on privatization. See Barlow &
Clarke, supra note 10.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 27-30 (explaining the rationale for studying
privatizations in Bolivia, South Africa, and the Philippines in this Note).
17. See Susan Spronk, Roots of Resistance to Urban Water Privatization in Bolivia: The
"New Working Class," the Crisis of Neoliberalism, and Public Services, 71 INT'L LAB. & WORKING-
CLASS HIST. 8 (2007).
18. See Wu & Malaluan, supra note 3, at 214-19.
19. See Alexander J. Loftus & David A. McDonald, Of Liquid Dreams: A Political Ecology
of Water Privatization in Buenos Aires, 13 ENV'T & URBANIZATION 179 (2001). In their paper, Loftus
and McDonald primarily discuss the government's response to the Argentinian regulatory agency
involved in Buenos Aires's water privatization; an Argentinian minister prohibited regulators from
intervening on behalf of Argentinian citizens during a contract renegotiation. See id at 193.
20. Only one article has analyzed two privatizations. See Wu & Malaluan, supra note 3. Wu
and Malaluan's article, however, features two privatizations in a single city, Manila, as opposed to
analyzing privatizations in different countries. Budds and McGranahan's article also briefly discusses
water privatizations across the world, but focuses on the economics and regulatory structure underlying
water privatizations. See Budds & McGranahan, supra note 12.
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impoverished and wealthy populations the prevailing market rate. Instead of
charging fixed prices, privatizers should engage in progressive pricing,
whereby the poorest consumers pay well below the market rate. In tandem with
21other programs, progressive pricing can reconcile the tension between
resource allocation and poverty alleviation, leading to Pareto improvements.
Second, consumers' interests must be represented during the negotiation
and drafting phases. Concession agreements that prioritize consumers' interests
are more likely to succeed. Even in the developing world, governments can
represent consumers' interests by promoting economic transparency in the
bidding process. For example, governments can require prospective
concessionaires to submit due diligence findings and financial projections
before the bidding process starts. Disclosure and economic transparency will
further increase governments' bargaining power-and consumers' bargaining
power-during negotiations.
Third, because water is a public resource, privatization works best if a
regulatory agency can monitor, evaluate, and inspect water quality and rates
22
even after a deal is closed. Such efficient and proactive administrative bodies,
however, are icons of the developed world and are largely absent from the
developing world's political systems.23 When such administrative bodies are
established in developing nations, they usually become prime targets for
corruption, diminishing their efficacy as regulating agents. Nevertheless, third-
party funding, if restructured as a regulatory mechanism, can strongly
incentivize governments to regulate privatizations on behalf of their citizens.
Currently, the World Bank provides governments financial incentives to
privatize, usually in the form of a single payment when the concession
agreement is signed.24 Rather than providing a lump sum payment, the World
Bank should tie funding to targeted development goals. Such an arrangement-
known as "impact funding"-realigns governments' incentives: instead of
being paid to privatize, governments are paid to privatize well, focusing on
specific objectives throughout the privatization.
To make these three claims, this Note proceeds in five parts. Part I
describes the methodology underlying my analysis. In particular, I focus on
how this Note will define each of the three factors ("the three-factor model")-
class dynamics, business and deal structure, and political climate-used to
analyze each privatization. Part I also describes my rationale for selecting each
21. See infra Section V.A.
22. See Budds & McGranahan, supra note 12, at 93.
23. Cf Ruben Lamdany, Foreword to Navin Girishankar & Migara De Silva, Strategic
Management for Government Agencies: An Institutional Approach for Developing and Transitional
Economies v (World Bank Discussion Paper No. 386, 1998) (noting that Girishankar and De Silva's
discussion paper points out ways in which administrative agencies in the developing world can become
more efficient); id at 10 ("[I]t is difficult to hold managers in developing countries responsible for
outcomes of policies.").
24. See, e.g., O'Neill, supra note 1, at 362; Peru: Access to Clean and Affordable Water,
FOOD & WATER WATCH, http://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/global/latin-america/peru/peru-access-to
-clean-and-affordable-water (last visited Dec. 4, 2014).
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privatization. Parts II, III, and IV use the three-factor model to analyze water
privatizations in Cochabamba, Bolivia; KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa; and
Manila, Philippines, respectively. Part V synthesizes my findings, outlining
policies that can enhance the efficacy of water privatizations in the developing
world.
I. METHODOLOGY
This Note studies three water privatizations: Cochabamba, Bolivia;
KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa; and Manila, Philippines. Although governments
in the developing world have conducted a plethora of water privatizations in
the past two decades,25 this Note only examines these three privatizations for
two reasons. First, these three privatizations provide a global and cross-
continental framework to analyze the successes and failures of water
privatizations. Second, these three case studies illustrate the dynamics
underlying both successful and failed privatizations-scholars have deemed the
privatizations in Bolivia 26 and South Africa 27 failures, but scholars and
authorities have universally regarded the privatization in Manila, Philippines as
a success.
2 8
Before discussing the particularities of each privatization, this Part will
define the three-factor model this Note will use to analyze each privatization.
As mentioned in the Introduction, this Note primarily uses three factors-class
dynamics, business and deal structure, and political climate-because scholars
have often studied all three factors in the context of a single privatization.
Before delving into each factor, it is important to acknowledge that this Note
analyzes each factor independently and without weighting each against the
others.
A. Class Dynamics
Scholars have adopted and rejected several definitions of social class.29
Because this Note analyzes how privatizations influence existing class
dynamics, this Part will construe class dynamics vis-a-vis Pareto
25. See Budds & McGranahan, supra note 12, at 101.
26. See OLIVERA & LEwis, supra note 13, at 7; see also sources cited infra Subsection II.B.3
(discussing the aftermath of the privatization in Cochabamba, Bolivia).
27. See Patrick Bond, Water, Health, and the Commodification Debate, 42 REV. RADiCAL
POL. ECON. 445, 455-56 (2010); see also sources cited infra Subsection HLI.B.3 (discussing the aftermath
of the privatization in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa).
28. See Wu & Malaluan, supra note 3, at 207, 217 (claiming the water privatization in eastern
Manila, Philippines, was a success because the privatizer prospered and ultimately became a publicly-
listed company several years after the privatization); Jude Esguerra, Manila Water Privatization:
Universal Service Coverage After the Crisis?, U.N. RES. INST. SOCIAL DEv. 39-40 (June 2005),
http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3CO05BCCF9/httpNetITFramePDF?ReadForm&parentunid=7B9OD9FA
CECE6689C 1257A52005900D4&parentdoctype-paper&netitpath=80256B3C005BCCF9/(httpAuxPag
es)/7B90D9FACECE6689C1257A52005900D4/Sfile/desguerr.pdf; see also sources cited infra
Subsection IV.B.3 (discussing the aftermath of the privatization in Manila, Philippines).
29. See M. Reza Nakhaie et al., Social Inequalities, Social Capital, and Health of Canadians,
39 REV. RADICAL POL. ECON. 562, 568 (2007).
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improvements-a proxy for a privatization's success-instead of presenting a
precise definition of social class. 30 In the context of this Note, a privatization
positively influences class dynamics if it delivers Pareto improvements.31
Conversely, a privatization negatively influences class dynamics if it causes a
detriment to one party to the deal, whether that may be the privatizers,
government, or general public. For example, a privatization may fail to deliver
Pareto improvements if the privatization intensifies existing economic
differences or further limits access to the privatized good. Likewise, a
privatization may fail to deliver Pareto improvements if the privatizer or the
government does not realize a profit from the deal.
Privatization literature supports this Note's construction of class
dynamics vis-d-vis Pareto improvements. Privatization experts support the idea
that Pareto improvements can be used as a proxy for a privatization's success,
with one scholar noting that "any denationalisation programme should be
designed to seek Pareto improvements, meaning that employees, consumers,
[the] government and new owners will be better off, or at least no
worse ....32
B. Business and Deal Structure
To evaluate each privatization's business and deal structure, this Note
will employ the methodology used in Xun Wu and Nepomuceno Malaluan's
article, A Tale of Two Concessionaires: A Natural Experiment of Water
Privatization in Metro Manila.33 In their article, Wu and Malaluan primarily
examine each privatized company's (1) corporate governance structure and (2)
water rates to evaluate business and deal structure. 34 This Note applies Wu and
Malaluan's methodology because Wu and Malaluan have used corporate
governance and water rates to critique privatization policies and differentiate
between successful and unsuccessful privatizations. According to Wu and
Malaluan's analysis, corporate governance can influence the price a water
company charges for water, affecting a privatization's impact on class
dynamics. In addition to employing Wu and Malaluan's definition, this Note
will also explore which constituencies-privatizers, consumers, or
30. See infra notes 31-32 (describing authorities that agree that Pareto improvements are a
marker of a privatization's success). Pareto improvements make at least some members of society
"better off," but no one "worse off." Robert N. Stavins et al., Interpreting Sustainability in Economic
Terms: Dynamic Efficiency Plus Intergenerational Equity, 79 ECON. LETTERS 339, 341 (2003).
31. As suggested in the Introduction, a policy delivers Pareto improvements if no party is
worse off or all parties are better off compared to the status quo. See Brubaker, supra note 5, at 115
(defining Pareto improvements as results "that make one party to a deal better off without making
another party worse off').
32. Pietrogiovanna, supra note 5, at 2; see also, e.g., Ingo Vogelsang, Micro-Economic
Effects of Privatizing Telecommunications Enterprises, 13 B.U. INT'L L.J. 313, 314 (1995) ("The ideal
result of an economic policy measure is a Pareto improvement whereby at least one group of agents...
experiences an improvement, and no group experiences a deterioration.").
33. See Wu & Malaluan, supra note 3.
34. See id
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governments 3 5-were represented in the drafting and negotiation phases of the
privatization deal.
C. Political Climate
In studying the political climate during water privatizations, scholars have
focused on the government's regulatory regime, or lack thereof, after the
36privatization deal is closed. Alexander Loftus and David McDonald, for
example, emphasize the inherent tension between government and
administrative oversight in their article. 37 More importantly, Loftus and
McDonald demonstrate that in the developing world, when a government-
appointed regulator monitors water privatizations, the regulator is incapable of
safeguarding consumers' interests in the privatization due to immitigable
conflicts of interest. 38 Although privatizations are inherently designed to
eliminate governmental control, some vestige of oversight is necessary to
ensure that the privatization does not create greater inefficiencies. In the case of
water, where the privatized good itself is the lifeblood of the human race, the
case for regulation becomes stronger. Therefore, given other scholars'
construction of "political climate" and the intrinsic need for regulation in water
privatizations, this Note will focus on (1) the existence, (2) the role, and (3) the
political independence of each country's regulatory authority in each water
privatization.
II. COCHABAMBA, BOLIVIA
Scholars regard the water privatization in Cochabamba, Bolivia, as a
failure. 39 This Part describes the background of the privatization and the
aftermath of the privatization. In addition, this Part will apply the three-factor
model to analyze the privatization in Cochabamba.
A. Background
Bolivia began a wave of privatizations in 1985,4o following the election
of Victor Paz Estenssoro's right-of-center government. 41 To stabilize inflation,
Estenssoro implemented a "New Economic Policy," a plan to deregulate and
35. These three constituencies are derived from Pietrogiovanna's construction ofprivatization
and Pareto improvements. See Pietrogiovanna, supra note 5, at 2.
36. See, e.g., Loftus & McDonald, supra note 19, at 187-88.
37. See id. at 188 (describing the politicization of regulators and the government's "lack of
respect" for regulators in privatizations).
38. See id. at 187-88.
39. See, e.g., OLIVERA & LEWIS, supra note 13; Willem Assies, David Versus Goliath in
Cochabamba: Water Rights, Neoliberalism, and the Revival of Social Protest in Bolivia, 30 LATIN AM.
PERSP. 14, 30 (2003).
40. OLIVERA & LEWIS, supra note 13, at 7.
41. Juan Antonio Morales & Jeffrey D. Sachs, Bolivia's Economic Crisis, in DEVELOPING
COUNTRY DEBT AND THE WORLD ECONOMY 57, 74 (Jeffrey D. Sachs ed., 1989).
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privatize state-owned enterprises (SOEs). 42 In addition to the Estenssoro
government, the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and United States
also pressured the Bolivian government to privatize SOEs in the mid-1980s.
43
Following two waves of privatizations in 1992 44 and 1994, 45 the Bolivian
government sold state-owned oil and gas, telecommunications, airlines, power
generation, and railroad companies. Nevertheless, unemployment surged as
unionized workers in SOEs were left jobless. In response to populist riots in
1997, the government declared a state of siege, and the government continued
its policies of economic liberalization. 47 According to scholars, Bolivia's
privatization plans crescendoed in 1999 with the water privatization in
Cochabamba.
B. The Cochabamba Privatization
1. Background
Decades before the privatization, Cochabamba and its surrounding areas
underwent a "socioeconomic transformation., 49 The city, previously agrarian,
became a hub of commerce and industry. 50 As a result, Cochabamba's
population grew from 205,000 in 1976 to 414,000 in 1992, and only fifty-seven
percent of the city's population had potable water coverage.5 1 The remaining
forty-three percent obtained water from "tanker trucks, privately constructed
wells, or self-help organizations such as cooperatives, associations, and water
communities."' 52 Consequently, the Bolivian government used a number of
"stopgap measures" to alleviate Cochabamba's water shortage.5 3 Because of
the city's dynamics, one scholar has stated that Cochabamba was
"overdetermined to become the scene of [a] water war.",54
Servicio Municipal de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado (SEMAPA) ran
Cochabamba's potable water systems. 55 Because of a flawed pricing scheme,
SEMAPA charged the heaviest water users "much less per unit of water than
low-volume users," leading the poorest users to seek water from other
42. Id.
43. BENJAMIN KOHL & LINDA C. FARTHING, IMPASSE IN BOLIVIA: NEOLIBERAL HEGEMONY
AND POPULAR RESISTANCE 107 (2006).
44. Benjamin Kohl, Privatization Bolivia Style: A Cautionary Tale, 28 INT'L J. URB. &
REGIONAL RES. 893, 897-98 (2004).
45. KOHL & FARTHING, supra note 43, at 107.
46. Kohl, supra note 44, at 898.
47. Assies, supra note 39, at 14-15.
48. KOHL & FARTHING, supra note 43, at 9.
49. Assies, supra note 39, at 18.
50. Id.
51. Id at 19.
52. Id.
53. Id For example, the Bolivian government drilled wells in Quillacollo, a rural town near
Cochabamba, leading to future rural-urban conflicts. Id
54. Id. at 18.
55. O'Neill, supra note 1, at 363.
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sources. 56 Moreover, because of faulty infrastructure, SEMAPA lost over half
of the water it carried to Cochabamba and was saddled with over US$35
million in debt. 57In response to SEMAPA's gross inefficiency and
Cochabamba's acute water shortage, the World Bank advocated for a
privatization program. To compel Bolivia to privatize, the World Bank
conditioned the approval of loans to Cochabamba in exchange for the Bolivian
government's privatization of SEMAPA 8
The Bolivian government followed the World Bank's advice. Before
signing the contract with the concessionaires, the government amended its
water laws. Under a previous law, which was passed in 1906, Bolivian
landowners owned any water that crossed their lands. 59 To privatize water in
Cochabamba, the Bolivian government changed water ownership: under Law
2029, all water in Bolivia was now owned by the state, and the state could sell
its rights to third parties. 60 While the 1906 law emphasized affordability and
universal access, Law 2029 was primarily concerned with "economic
efficiency" and "financial sufficiency." 61 Scholars have concluded that Law




The Bolivian government began soliciting bids for SEMAPA's
privatization in 1999. Due to the privatization's high cost, however, the
63government only received one bid. The single and winning bid came from a
consortium named Aguas del Tunari, a Cayman Islands corporation whose
majority shareholder was International Water Limited. 64 International Water
Limited was a subsidiary of Bechtel Corporation, an American engineering
company that has managed "more than 25,000 extraordinary projects... in 160
countries on all seven continents." 65 Other members of the Aguas del Tunari
consortium included a Spanish corporation named Bengoa and four or five
Bolivian companies.
66
Even though it championed SEMAPA's privatization, the World Bank
began to doubt that the concession agreement was negotiated in the best
56. Id.
57. Id. at 363-64.
58. Maria McFarland Snchez-Moreno & Tracy Higgins, No Recourse: Transnational
Corporations and the Protection of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in Bolivia, 27 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 1663, 1748-49 (2004).
59. 28 Nov. 1906, Ley de Dominio y Aprovechamiento de Aguas de 1906 [Domain Act and
Water Use Law], LA GACETA OFICIAL (Bolivia).
60. Ley No. 2029, 29 Oct. 1999, Ley de Servicios de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado Sanitario
[Potable Water and Sewerage Law], LA GACETA OFICIAL (Bol.).
61. O'Neill, supra note 1, at 367.
62. Id.
63. See Sdnchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 58, at 1750-51.
64. O'Neill, supra note 1, at 365.
65. About Us, BECHTEL., http://www.bechtel.com/about-us (last visited Dec. 4, 2014).
66. O'Neill, supra note 1, at 365.
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interest of Bolivian citizens. 67 Because Aguas del Tunari was the sole bidder,
the World Bank feared that the consortium "had been able to strong-arm the
Bolivian government into a bad bargain." 68 The concession leased
Cochabamba's water supply to Aguas del Tunari for a period of forty years.
Throughout the term of the concession, the consortium was guaranteed a profit
of fifteen to seventeen percent per year.69 Aguas del Tunari could also install
meters to monitor the water usage of those operating their own private wells.
70
In exchange, Aguas del Tunari was to supply water to existing SEMAPA
customers and expand SEMAPA's infrastructure. 7' The consortium took over
SEMAPA on November 1, 1999.72 During the first two months of operation,
Aguas del Tunari increased Cochabamba's water supply by thirty percent.73 On
January 1, 2000, rates increased by thirty-five percent. Throughout the
duration of the concession, water rates increased by an aggregate of four
hundred percent to compensate the consortium for large-scale repairs.
75
3. The Aftermath
Although Aguas del Tunari's price hikes were not arbitrary,
Cochabamba's residents believed they were. By January 1, 2000, some
people's water bills had doubled, and ordinary workers' water bills "amounted
,,76to a quarter of their monthly income. Moreover, residents who had only used
their own private water wells now feared rising water bills, too; as part of the
concession, Aguas del Tunari had the right to charge those who were using
their own private wells.77
On December 28, 1999, Cochabamba residents staged the first mass
protest against the Aguas del Tunari concession. 78 Approximately 15,000 to
20,000 Bolivians mobilized in Cochabamba's central plaza, demanding that the
Bolivian government repeal Law 2029 and renegotiate the contract with Aguas
del Tunari.79 In response to the uprising, the Bolivian government promised to
renegotiate the concession and amend the new water law, but declined to
67. Id.
68. Id. at 365-66.
69. Id. at 366.
70. Sinchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 58, at 1756.
71. O'Neill, supra note 1, at 364.
72. Perspective: Cochabamba and the Aguas del Tunari Consortium, BECHTEL (Dec. 2005),
http://www.bechtel.com/files/perspective-aguas-del-tunari-water-concession [hereinafter Bechtel Fact
Sheet].
73. Id.
74. Bechtel Fact Sheet, supra note 72.
75. O'Neill, supra note 1, at 367; William Finnegan, Letter from Bolivia: Leasing the Rain,
NEW YORKER, Apr. 8, 2002, http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2002/04/08/020408faFACTI.
76. Finnegan, supra note 75.
77. O'Neill, supra note 1, at 368; see supra text accompanying note 70.
78. O'Neill, supra note 1, at 368.
79. The Fight for Water and Democracy: An Interview with Oscar Olivera, 21
MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, June 2000, http://multinationalmonitor.org/mm2000/00june/interview.html
[hereinafter Oscar Olivera Interview].
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reduce Cochabamba's water rates.80
Unsatisfied with the government's response, Cochabamba residents
"refused to pay their water bills for the next two months." 8' In February 2000,
violence erupted. Even though the protestors peacefully blockaded
Cochabamba's plaza, the Bolivian government sent more than one thousand
soldiers who used tear gas, beatings, and bullets against the protestors. 82 After
the protest in February, the Bolivian government finally agreed to reduce water
rates and froze them until November 2000. 83 Aguas del Tunari agreed to refund
those who had previously paid higher rates. 84 Nevertheless, the government's
compromise did not appease Cochabamba's residents. In early April, protestors
staged a strike to demand that the Bolivian government rescind the concession
agreement with Aguas del Tunari. 85 The Cochabamba regional government
agreed to meet with the protestors, but Bolivia's president sent soldiers to
interrupt negotiations, fearing that any agreement between the protestors and
the regional government "would jeopardize the contract." 86 Before interrupting
negotiations, the soldiers and protestors fought on the streets, and Bolivia
declared a "national state of emergency., 87 In the midst of the protest and
fighting, however, Aguas del Tunari voluntarily left Bolivia, and SEMAPA
regained control of Cochabamba's water system.88 The government repealed
Law 2029 on April 11.89 In November 2001, Aguas del Tunari, and in
particular Bechtel, pursued arbitration to recover US$25 million in the World
Bank's International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID). 90 Ultimately, Bechtel dropped its claim in exchange for Bolivia
absolving Aguas del Tunari of any potential liability. 91
C. The Model Applied
1. Class Dynamics
Social class is deeply entrenched in Bolivian society. 92 Even before
80. O'Neill, supra note 1, at 369; Oscar Olivera Interview, supra note 79.
81. O'Neill, supra note 1, at 369.
82. Sinchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 58, at 1769-70.
83. O'Neill, supra note 1, at 369.
84. Bechtel Fact Sheet, supra note 72.
85. See Sdnchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 58, at 1770.
86. O'Neill, supra note 1, at 370.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 370-71.
89. Id. at 371.
90. Bechtel Fact Sheet, supra note 72.
91. Damon Vis-Dunbar & Luke Eric Peterson, Bolivian Water Dispute Settled, Bechtel
Forgoes Compensation, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS (Jan. 20, 2006),
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2006/itnjan20_2006.pdf; see also Cochabamba - Victory over Bechtel, FOOD
& WATER WATCH, http://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/global/latin-america/bolivia/cochabamba-%E2
%80%93-victory-over-bechtel (last visited Dec. 4, 2014) [hereinafter Victory over Bechtel] (noting that
Bechtel's only compensation from the breach of the concession agreement was symbolic, a mere five
bolivianos, equivalent to one U.S. dollar).
92. DENIS LUCY AVILES IRAHOLA, POPULAR PARTICIPATION, DECENTRALISATION, AND
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Bolivian independence, predominantly white mestizos owned land through the
hacienda system. 93 In 1952, however, Bolivian peasants who were
"disenfranchised for centuries," began to reclaim land. 94 These "peasant
workers," 95 called campesinos in Bolivian society, seized the land belonging to
the landowners, or patrones,96 beginning a revolutionary movement that swept
the Bolivian countryside like "a wild fire."97 The government could not control
the campesino movement and validated the campesinos' actions by passing the
Agrarian Reform Decree of August 2, 1953, a land redistribution bill.98
Class differences intensified as Estenssoro's government pushed the New
Economic Policy. As a result of privatizations, Bolivian mines closed, 99 and
many working-class miners left rural areas for urban areas. 100 Along with
supporting the New Economic Policy, the U.S. government supported Bolivian
President Hugo Banzer Su.rez's war on drugs, which led to the closure of
several coca farms and more economic plight. 101 Consequently, urban
crowding increased: poor Bolivians congregated in barrios, neighborhoods
located on the fringes of urban areas.
102
In Cochabamba, the poor were systematically excluded from the city's
water system even before the Aguas del Tunari concession was signed.
Because of SEMAPA's pricing scheme, the poor were priced out of a
municipal-owned water system. Nevertheless, the poor managed, retrieving
water from private wells or other sources. 103 When Aguas del Tunari took over
for SEMAPA, it delivered services to the same group that SEMAPA had
excluded through its pricing: the poor. Aguas del Tunari's emphasis on
universal access at the prevailing market rate, however, intensified class
differences. The poor were accustomed to retrieving water after tendering a
minimal payment. 104 With the concession, water prices increased. For example,
"a teacher who made $80 a month . . .saw his bill go up from $5 to $25 a
month."
10 5
LOCAL POWER RELATIONS IN BOLIVIA 159 (2005) (noting that white mestizos "still enjoy[ed] social
supremacy" despite being "displaced from their dominant position in social affairs").
93. Id. at 159-60.
94. James V. Kohl, Peasant and Revolution in Bolivia, 58 HISP. AM. HIST. REV. 238, 242
(1978).
95. See Assies, supra note 39, at 15. Some sources also call campesinos "farmers." Richard
Patch, Bolivia: U.S. Assistance in a Revolutionary Setting, in SOCIAL CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICA
TODAY 108, 119 (1961).
96. Patrones were the land-owning class in Bolivia. See Kohl, supra note 94, at 255.
97. Patch, supra note 95, at 122.
98. Kohl, supra note 94, at 242.
99. JUNE C. NASH, PRACTICING ETHNOGRAPHY IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD: AN
ANTHROPOLOGICAL ODYSSEY 173 (2007).
100. NICOLE FABRICANT, MOBILIZING BOLIVIA'S DISPLACED: INDIGENOUS POLITICS & THE
STRUGGLE OVER LAND 36 (2012).
101. Kohl, supra note 44, at 900.
102. KOHL & FARTHING, supra note 43, at 159.
103. Assies, supra note 39, at 19.
104. Finnegan, supra note 75.
105. Oscar Olivera Interview, supra note 79.
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Aguas del Tunari's rate hike primarily caused a detriment to campesinos,
the group most affected by the consortium's right to charge well owners for
operating their own private wells. 106 Because campesinos had a "deeply
textured tradition of water management dating from pre-colonial times,"10 7 they
did not believe that water could be commoditized and thus collectively
managed water in neighborhoods, called barrios, just outside of
Cochabamba.10 8 Water wells were methodically constructed, with the future of
the campesino community in mind. Despite the deep-rooted inequality in
Bolivian society, water was one item that the campesinos controlled. For
example, in Villa San Miguel, a barrio outside of Cochabamba, residents
communally funded and dug a well from 1994 to 1997 to service the barrio's
water needs. 109 Because of their collective efforts, Villa San Miguel residents
obtained clean water and only paid the water cooperative two to five U.S.
dollars a month. 10 After the concession agreement was signed, however, the
consortium effectively priced Villa San Miguel's residents-campesinos--out
of their own water. Thus, in the context of this Note's model, the Aguas del
Tunari concession negatively influenced class dynamics, intensifying existing
economic disparities and limiting campesinos' access to water.
2. Business and Deal Structure
Aguas del Tunari's business structure is difficult to examine because the
consortium only operated for six months. Moreover, the consortium
presumably lagged behind initial revenue projections due to mass protests over
water rates." Therefore, unlike other Parts, which discuss consortia that
operated for several years, this Part will use the company's financials as a
proxy for the company's business structure.
a. Business Structure and Water Rates
Upon assuming service in Cochabamba, Aguas del Tunari was required
to pay US$1 million of SEMAPA's trading debts, rent fixed assets from
SEMAPA, and buy SEMAPA's moveable assets and inventory.11 2 In only six
months of operation, Aguas del Tunari had invested US$10 million in capital in
Cochabamba's water system, and after the Bolivian government unilaterally
rescinded the concession, the consortium claimed lost profits of US$25
106. See Sinchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 58, at 1756; supra Section L.A (discussing
how the model defines class dynamics).
107. Erik. J. Woodhouse, Note, The "Guerra del Agua" and the Cochabamba Concession:
Social Risk and Foreign Direct Investment in Public Infrastructure, 39 STAN. J. INT'L L. 295, 304
(2003).
108. O'Neill, supra note 1, at 364.
109. Finnegan, supra note 75.
110. Id.
111. As a result of protests, the Bolivian government instituted a rate freeze, and Aguas del
Tunari refunded those users who had paid higher rates in January. See supra text accompanying notes
86-87.
112. Bechtel Fact Sheet, supra note 72.
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million. 113 Given these (limited) financials, it is highly likely that the
consortium was in a precarious financial position. Despite Aguas del Tunari's
increase in costs, revenues remained the same or possibly decreased; the
consortium had agreed to a nine-month rate freeze, further limiting the
consortium's future revenues and cash flow. Although the consortium
voluntarily left Bolivia, 114 Aguas del Tunari's underlying financials would have
maintained increased water rates for several years, had the consortium
continued operating Cochabamba's water system.
b. Bargaining Power in Deal Structure and Negotiations
From the beginning, Bolivian citizens were procedurally and
substantively disadvantaged by the Aguas de Tunari concession agreement.
Bolivian citizens' interests were poorly represented during the passage of Law
2029, which legalized water privatization in Bolivia. The subject matter of Law
2029 was extremely controversial in Bolivia, especially for campesinos and
rural Bolivians. 115 Because of Law 2029's title, Ley de Servicios de Agua
Potable y Alcantarillado (Law on Potable Water and Sanitary Sewage
Services), rural farmers believed the law did not apply to them. 116 The Bolivian
Congress passed Law 2029 in a forty-eight hour session, leaving opposition
groups no time to react. 17 Therefore, Bolivian citizens were procedurally
powerless even before the privatization deal was closed: they had no
opportunity to debate or question the legitimacy of Law 2029 and, by
extension, the legal legitimacy of the concession agreement.
In terms of this Note's model, Bolivian citizens were also poorly
represented in the negotiation and drafting phases of the concession. Because
Aguas del Tunari was the only bidder, the Bolivian government-the only
party capable of representing the Bolivian public's interests-lacked
bargaining power in the negotiation process. Substantively, the terms of the
agreement disadvantaged Bolivian citizens. For example, Aguas del Tunari
could control Cochabamba's water supply for forty years and was guaranteed a
profit of fifteen to seventeen percent per year.' 8 Thus, the concession only
further handicapped Bolivian citizens' bargaining power.
3. Political Climate
Even though the Bolivian people's interests were not well-represented in
the concession agreement, the Bolivian government did create a regulatory
authority to oversee water privatizations. The regulatory agency, called the
113. Id.
114. Bechtel Fact Sheet, supra note 72.
115. Sinchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 58, at 1759.
116. See id. ("[I]rrigators did not realize that Law 2029 would affect them because it was
supposed to be a law about urban water services.").
117. Id. at 1760.
118. O'Neill, supra note 1, at 366.
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Sectoral Superintendency of Basic Sanitation (SSBS), played a rather passive
role in the Cochabamba privatization.1 19 SSBS was not politically independent
from the Bolivian government, leaving the agency incapable of adequately
representing the Bolivian public's needs throughout the privatization. 120
Moreover, SSBS had significant budget constraints and lacked trained staff.12 1
Because the Bolivian government negotiated on behalf of the Bolivian people,
SSBS was effectively barred from negotiations over water rates and the
underlying deal's terms. 122 Hence, SSBS was ineffectual throughout the
privatization, leaving mass protestors and the government to negotiate by
means of violence. 123 SSBS's role corroborates Loftus's and McDonald's
regulatory theory advanced in Section I.C: because of the inherent tension
between government and administrative oversight, government-appointed
regulators are largely ineffective in overseeing privatizations in developing
nations. 124
III. KWAZULU-NATAL, SOUTH AFRICA
Scholars regard the water privatization in KwaZulu-Natal as a failure.
1 25
Although the privatization in KwaZulu-Natal did not result in mass protests,
the privatization led to severe public health problems. This Part will describe
the consequences of privatization and apply the three-factor model to the Siza
privatization in KwaZulu-Natal.
A. Background
After holding its first post-apartheid elections in 1994, South Africa
turned to privatization. 126 By 1999, the African National Congress (ANC) had
privatized assets worth approximately 11 billion South African rand and had
yet to sell SOEs worth approximately R 120 billion. 127 Although privatization
is generally thought to disadvantage the working class and the poor,128 South
Africa's privatization was designed to benefit blacks; in the apartheid era,
SOEs were designed in part to benefit the wealthy, providing employment
opportunities for "otherwise unemployable whites." 129 The South African
119. Cochabamba, Bolivia, Urban Water Expansion: Case Study (Water), ECOLE SUPtR1EURE
DE COMMERCE DE PAu 4 (Nov. 2012), http://www.esc-pau.fr/ppp/documents/featured-projects
/bolivia.pdf.
120. Id. at 9.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 84-85.
124. Loftus & McDonald, supra note 19, at 188 (describing the politicization of regulators and
the government's "lack of respect" for regulators in privatizations).
125. Pauw, supra note 6.
126. See The Painful Privatisation of South Africa, ECONOMIST, Sept. 9, 1999,
http://www.economist.com/node/238407 [hereinafter Painful Privatisation].
127. Id.
128. See Kohl, supra note 44.
129. Painful Privatisation, supra note 126.
2015]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
government used privatization as a means to deliver services to poor areas and
to encourage black ownership of privatized businesses. For example, in the
privatization of Telkom, a South African telecommunications company,' 31 the
ANC reserved a tranche of shares for blacks.' 32
B. The KwaZulu-Natal Privatization
1. Background
Bordered by Lesotho, Swaziland, and Mozambique, KwaZulu-Natal is
South Africa's third-smallest'33 and second-richest province. 3 4 Nevertheless,
approximately half of KwaZulu-Natal's residents live in poverty, and
approximately fourteen percent of households lack access to running tap
water. 135 As of the 2011 census, approximately eighty-seven percent of the
province's population identified as black, and approximately four percent
identified as white.' 
36
KwaZulu-Natal had undergone multiple water crises even before water
privatization in the late 1990s. For example, in 1982, the province suffered a
major cholera outbreak: approximately twelve thousand cases and twenty-four
deaths were reported. In response, the province's apartheid government
constructed nine communal taps, which revolutionized water access for the
province's residents. 137 Residents made connections to these communal taps
and had free access to clean water for seventeen years.'
38
In 1994, however, the entire country experienced a water crisis. Because
of droughts, a third of South Africa lacked access to safe and convenient
drinking water.1 39 Thus, when the ANC won the 1994 elections, access to clean
drinking water became a priority for the new government. 140 The post-
apartheid South African Constitution formally provided the right to access
sufficient water and permitted the government to "take reasonable legislative
130. Id.
131. About Us, TELKOM, https://secureapp.telkom.co.za/wholesale-web/information/index.jsp
(last visited Dec. 4, 2014).
132. Painful Privatisation, supra note 126.
133. KwaZulu-Natal Province, South Africa, SOUTHAFRICA.INFO (Nov. 19, 2012),
http://www.southaffrica.info/about/geography/kwazulu-natal.htm.
134. KwaZulu Natal Region, INDUS. DEV. CORP., http://www.idc.co.za/kwazulu-natal/kwazulu
-natal-regional-director.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2014).
135. KwaZulu-Natal Facts & Figures, ASS'N FOR RURAL ADVANCEMENT, http://www.afra.co
.za/jit default 975.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2014); Census 2011, STAT. S. AFR. 59 fig.3.50 (2012),
http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P03014/P030142011 .pdf.
136. Census 2011, supra note 135, at 17 tbl.3.3. The remainder of KwaZulu-Natal's population
is identified as "Indian/Asian," "coloured," and "other." Id.
137. Pauw, supra note 6, at 822.
138. Id.
139. Mike Muller, Parish Pump Politics: The Politics of Water Supply in South Africa, 7
PROGRESS DEV. STUD. 33, 34 (2007).
140. Stephen Greenberg, The Rise and Fall of Water Privatization in Rural South Africa: A
Critical Evaluation of the ANC's First Term of Office, 1994-1999, in THE AGE OF COMMODITY: WATER
PRIVATIZATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 206, 206-07 (David A. McDonald & Greg Ruiters eds., 2005).
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. . .measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive
realisation of [the right to water].' 41 Even though the private sector did not
manage or operate any part of South Africa's water system at the time, 142 the
South African government employed privatization to fulfill its constitutional
mandate.
2. The Concession
Water privatization began in KwaZulu-Natal in 1999.143 Four companies
bid for the concession. 144 Ultimately, the South African government agreed to a
thirty-year concession with Siza. Siza's majority shareholder was SAUR, a
French company specializing in water management for local governments.
45
SAUR held a fifty-eight percent stake in the consortium, and Metropolitan
Life, Women's Development Bank Investment Holding, the Investment
Progress Group Holdings, and NANO Investment Holdings-South African
companies managed by professionals from "previously disadvantaged
communities"-held the remaining forty-two percent. 146 The concession was
worth more than R 500 million, with "half being raised by SAUR and half by
South African banks.' 47
As part of the concession, Siza agreed to "maintain, rehabilitate,
redesign[,] .. .improve[,] and expand" existing infrastructure. 148 The South
African government signed the concession despite opposition from labor
unions. 49 According to several experts, the concession was signed on terms
that were "very favourable to the private sector."'150
3. The Aftermath
To monetize water usage in KwaZulu-Natal, Siza and local government
authorities installed prepaid meters on the province's nine communal taps and
on private taps in dwellings. 151 Water-previously free for KwaZulu-Natal's
residents-now carried a fee. 52 Several residents could not pay Siza's fees or
141. S.AFR.CONST.h.2§27, 1996.
142. Greenberg, supra note 140, at 209.
143. Pauw, supra note 6, at 820.
144. DAVID HEMSON & HERBERT BATIDZIRAI, PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS AND THE
POOR: DOLPHIN COAST WATER CONCESSION 45 (2002), http://www.ucl.ac.ukldpu-projects/drivers-urb
change/urb infrastructure/pdf public_pivate services/WDFID_WEDCHemsonPPP andPoo Dolp
hinCoast.pdf.
145. Greenberg, supra note 140, at 211; Saur: Comprehensive Delegated Management of
Public Services for Local Authorities, SOCIETE D'AMdNAGEMENT URBAIN ET RURAL,
http://www.saur.com/en/index.php/group/profile (last visited Dec. 4, 2014).
146. HEMSON & BATIDZIRAI, supra note 144, at 48; Pauw, supra note 6, at 821.
147. Greenberg, supra note 140, at 211.
148. HEMSON & BATIDZIRAI, supra note 144, at 49.
149. Id. at 41-42.
150. Greenberg, supra note 140, at 211.
151. See Pauw, supra note 6, at 822-23.
152. Id. at 821.
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were gradually "cut off' from Siza's water services as water rates increased.
153
The poorest residents "begg[ed] for water," chanting "no money, no water."'
154
Additionally, Siza's water infrastructure often needed repair; thus, even those
who could afford Siza's water rates lacked access to clean drinking water.
1 55
As a result, several residents used water from contaminated streams and
ponds. 156
In 2000, South Africa's worst cholera epidemic broke out in KwaZulu-
Natal. 157 Public health experts attributed the outbreak to water privatization. 15 8
In contrast to the cholera outbreak in 1982, which claimed twenty-four lives,
1 59
three hundred people died from cholera in the 2000 epidemic. 160 The province
had over 120,000 reported cases of cholera, and the epidemic spread to sixS 161
other provinces. At the beginning of the epidemic, local governments in
KwaZulu-Natal were rather indifferent.1 62 As the epidemic worsened, however,
the local government removed prepaid meters from communal taps, water rates
decreased, and the national government trucked in clean water to afflicted
areas. 163
Because of the cholera epidemic, Siza increased water rates by fifteen
percent in 2001.164 Siza's executives noted that the volume of customers was
not enough to cover the consortium's expenses. 165 SAUR renegotiated the
concession in 2001 due to a lack of profits.
166
C. The Model Applied
1. Class Dynamics
At the turn of the millennium, a third of the KwaZulu-Natal's residents
earned less than two dollars a day and "only the luckiest . . . ha[d] jobs,"
earning less than forty-five dollars a month-not enough to cover monthly food
153. Claire Provost, Is the Stage Being Set for New Water Wars in Africa?, GUARDIAN:
POVERTY MATTERS BLOG (Nov. 26, 2010, 12:31 PM), http://www.theguardian,com/global-development
/poverty-matters/20 10/nov/26/africa-water-privatisation.
154. BARNALI CHOUDHURY, PUBLIC SERVICES AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION
163 (2012).
155. Id.
156. Pauw, supra note 6, at 823; Trevor Ngwane, Water Privatisation: The Case Against, BBC
NEWS, June 3, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/talking_point/2959396.stm.
157. Ginger Thompson, Water Tap Often Shut to South Africa Poor, N.Y. TIMES, May 29,
2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/29/world/water-tap-often-shut-to-south-africa-poor.html.
158. David T. McKinley, The Struggle Against Water Privatisation in South Africa, in
RECLAIMING PUBLIC WATER 181, 184 (Belen Balanya et al. eds., 2005); Ngwane, supra note 156.
159. See supra text accompanying note 137.
160. McKinley, supra note 158, at 184.
161. Id.; Thompson, supra note 157.
162. McKinley, supra note 158, at 184.
163. Id.
164. Greenberg, supra note 140, at 211.
165. Id.
166. P. Bond & J. Duggard, Water, Human Rights and Social Conflict: South African
Experiences, 8 L. SOC. JUST. & GLOBAL DEV. 3, 9 (2008).
Is Successful Water Privatization a Pipe Dream?
and water costs. 16 7 When the consortium set water prices at five dollars per
month, in municipalities like Ngwelezane only 700 households could afford
water and "[t]wo thousand families remained unconnected. ' 168 Towns offered
prepaid cards to access communal taps, but the price of a prepaid card-nearly
four dollars-was more than several KwaZulu-Natal residents could pay. 16 9
Citizens gradually turned to public water sources. For example, a mother of
two in KwaZulu-Natal retrieved water from a "mud puddle," not out of gross
negligence, but out of sheer desperation.
1 70
Other residents were denied water access as they lost jobs. Siza curtailed
households' water access after several missed payments. For example, after a
household missed a certain number of payments, the consortium installed a
"trickler" into valves. The device caused water to flow at reduced pressures,
further decreasing the household's access to water. 17' In addition to Siza, local
authorities limited residents' water access after several missed payments. For
example, David Radebe, a KwaZulu-Natal resident who could initially afford
water payments of US$6.40 per month, was priced out of Siza's water market
after he lost his job. After authorities arrested Radebe for illegally installing a
pipe that would circumvent Siza's water meters, city officials disconnected his
water meter. 1
72
Even in post-apartheid South Africa, social class-not race-priced
several KwaZulu-Natal residents out of Siza's water. Water was more
accessible and cheaper during the apartheid era than the post-apartheid era.
173
Moreover, the province's cholera epidemic-triggered by a lack of affordable
water-started in a majority white town. 174 The provincial and local
governments' and Siza's actions did not appear to be racially based; instead,
governmental and corporate authorities targeted those priced out of the
prevailing market rate. Thus, in the context of this Note's model, the Siza
concession negatively influenced class dynamics, causing a detriment to both
blacks and whites and limiting KwaZulu-Natal's access to water. Far from
delivering Pareto improvements, the privatization resulted in a public health
crisis.
167. Thompson, supra note 157.
168. Pauw, supra note 6, at 822.
169. Id. Four dollars was more than several residents could pay because a third of South
Africans "live on less than [two dollars] a day." See Thompson, supra note 157; see also Pauw, supra
note 6, at 821-26 (documenting the experience of one KwaZulu-Natal resident who could not afford
prepaid cards).
170. Thompson, supra note 157.
171. Pauw, supra note 6, at 822.
172. ld. at 821.
173. See supra text accompanying note 138.
174. Pauw, supra note 6, at 823.
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2. Business and Deal Structure
To recover every cost associated with the upkeep of KwaZulu-Natal's
water system, Siza charged consumers prohibitively expensive water rates.
1 75
This business policy of recovering all upkeep costs, known as total cost
recovery, was "the brainchild of private water companies and World Bank
economists." 176 Business executives and economists earnestly believed that
total cost recovery could strengthen utility systems and developing economies,
and Siza's deal was contingent on total cost recovery's successful execution.'
77
Additionally, the South African government championed total cost recovery for
two reasons. First, the policy allowed the government to phase out subsidies
that were characteristic of the apartheid-era government. 178 Second, cost
recovery enabled governments and consortia to recover the cost of water
infrastructure projects. 179 In 1999, for example, water revenues were only R 6.6
million, as compared to costs of R 690 million.' 
80
Whatever total cost recovery's merits may be, the policy negatively
influenced Siza's business structure and consumers' water rates. Scholars
believe that Siza incurred costs and set prices without much foresight and due
diligence. For example, Professor David McDonald, an expert on South
African water privatization, noted that "[n]obody really ever bothered to find
out if [KwaZulu-Natal residents] could afford [privatized water]. And, as it
turn[ed] out, [they could not].' 181 Given the overwhelming emphasis on total
cost recovery, the consortium and local government created a deadweight loss
in South Africa, destabilizing the consortium's business structure 182 and the
country's public health.
3. Political Climate
The South African Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF)
oversaw water infrastructure and delivery in post-apartheid South Africa.'
8 3
The DWAF supported water privatization with two goals in mind: total cost
recovery and South African federalism. 184 Under the second goal, local
governments would oversee water systems. 185 But functioning local
175. Id. at 820.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. In the apartheid era, water services were provided by the national government, not local
governments. See Greenberg, supra note 140, at 213.
179. See Pauw, supra note 6, at 825 (acknowledging that total cost recovery enabled the South
African govemment to assume "a reduced role" and champion privatization).
180. Greenberg, supra note 140, at 213.
181. Pauw, supra note 6, at 821 (quoting Professor David McDonald, co-director of Canada's
Municipal Services Project).
182. See supra text accompanying notes 171-73.
183. David A. McDonald & Greg Ruiters, Theorizing Water Privatization in Southern Africa,
in THE AGE OF COMMODITY: WATER PRIVATIZATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, supra note 140, at 25.
184. Greenberg, supra note 140, at 213.
185. Id. at211.
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governments, especially elected local councils, were virtually nonexistent in
rural areas like KwaZulu-Natal. 186 Thus, the DWAF built local governments
"from scratch." 187 Lacking requisite knowledge and funding, such local
governments were ineffective at managing municipal water systems. 18 Experts
regarded the DWAF's "building of' local government capacity as "mixed at
best and highly disappointing at worst, with poor value for money being
obvious in too many cases."'
8 9
During the Siza privatization and subsequent cholera outbreak, the
experts' views were confirmed. For example, in early 2000, the
Ngwelezane/Empangeni municipality had US$10 million in reserves but chose
not to address the ongoing cholera crisis. 190 The municipal government even
refused to subsidize water services "to poor communities"; instead, the
municipality's subsidies went to the privatizers in the form of tax breaks.
Throughout the cholera epidemic, local governments continued enforcing
prepaid water meters. 19 Only after the cholera epidemic reached
Johannesburg-a city located outside KwaZulu-Natal-did local governments
freeze water rates at US$2.00 to US$2.50 per month. 192 Instead of the
municipal government, the national government provided KwaZulu-Natal with
US$2.5 million in emergency funds. 193
In terms of the three-factor model, the national government's transfer of
regulatory oversight to local governments fits Loftus and McDonald's
regulatory theory introduced in Section I.C: government-appointed regulators
are ineffective at overseeing privatizations on behalf of consumers. In South
Africa, local governments lacked the requisite knowledge to monitor
privatizations and supported the privatizers over consumers in the midst of a
public health crisis. Ultimately, South Africa paid "tens if not hundreds of
times more dealing with the health crisis" due to local governments' steadfast
support of privatization. 194 Because of the resulting inefficiencies and social
costs, a government-appointed regulator mismanaged KwaZulu-Natal's water
privatization, giving further credence to Loftus and McDonald's regulatory
theory. 1
95
186. Id. at 212.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. (quoting S. AFR. DEP'T WATER AFFAIRS & FORESTRY, THE REVIEW OF THE
NATIONAL BOTT PROGRAMME W 6018B - KwAZULu NATAL: DRAFT REPORT v (1998)).




194. Id. (quoting Professor David McDonald).
195. Loftus & McDonald, supra note 19.
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'IV. MANILA, PHILIPPINES
Scholars regard the Manila Water Company's privatization as a
success. 196 Since its inception, Manila Water Company has served Manila
residents for over fifteen years and it is now listed on Pamilihang Sapi ng
Pilipinas (the Philippine Stock Exchange). 197
A. Background
Facing financial losses, tremendous inefficiencies, and monopolistic
practices, the Philippines started a massive privatization program in the mid-
1980s. Led by President Maria Coraz6n Sumulong Aquino, the Philippine
government first privatized banks and 132 "nonfinancial corporations. ' 98 Due
to privatization and economic liberalization, the Philippine economy boomed.
In 1992, newly elected President Fidel Ramos, a supporter of former President
Aquinas, released the "Philippines 2000" plan, a blueprint for economic growth
that mobilized popular support for President Ramos's policies. 199 In 1993, the
Ramos Administration introduced competitive bidding in privatizing public
200 2011
utilities. When the Manila Water Company deal was closed, the
Philippines was relatively well-off: year-end inflation decreased from eleven
percent in the 1980s to nearly six percent in 1997, and domestic debts had
decreased from eighty-five percent of GNP in 1993 to fifty-eight percent of
GNP in 1996.202
B. The Manila Water Privatization
1. Background
In 1997, the Philippine government decided to privatize Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS), a "heavily indebted, overstaffed,
and inefficient" government agency. 203 Prior to privatization, MWSS could
only supply water seventeen hours per day to two-thirds of its coverage
population in Manila.2°4 By contrast, water systems in other major Southeast
Asian cities could supply a full day's worth of water to most of their coverage
196. See Wu & Malaluan, supra note 3, at 207; Esguerra, supra note 28, at 39-40.
197. Wu & Malaluan, supra note 3, at 207
198. GIANNI ZANINI, PHILIPPINES: FROM CRISIS TO OPPORTUNITY: COUNTRY ASSISTANCE
REVIEW 3 (1999).
199. Id. at4.
200. Id. at 8.
201. See Wu & Malaluan, supra note 3, at 209.
202. ZANINI, supra note 198, at 8.
203. Int'l Finance Corp., Philippines: Manila Water, WORLD BANK GROUP 2 (May 2010),
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/3f64dl 80498391 a5856cd7336b93d75f/PPPStoriesPhilippines
_ManilaWater.pdfMOD=AJPERES.
204. Arthur C. McIntosh & Cesar E. Yfliguez, Second Water Utilities Data Book: Asian and
Pacific Region, ASIAN DEV. BANK 3 tbl.1 (Oct. 1997), http://www.ircwash.org/sites/default/files
/Melntosh-1997-Second.pdf.
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populations. 205 Unserved households in Manila paid rates that were thirteentimes higher than MWSS's rates.2°6
Table 1: Water Supply and Coverage - Select Southeast Asian Cities
207
City Coverage (Hours/Day) Coverage Population (%)
Manila 17 67%
Bangkok 24 82%
Kuala Lumpur 24 100%
Mandalay 24 80%
Singapore 24 100%
To grant itself the authority to privatize MWSS, the Philippine
government passed the Water Crisis Act in 1995, two years before the
privatization. 208 In 1996, the government increased water rates by thirty-eight
percent and decreased MWSS's labor force by thirty percent.209 Immediately
before the privatization, the government split Manila into two zones: the east
zone and the west zone. A single concessionaire was prohibited from operating
water systems in both zones for three reasons: first, the government believed
that regulators had more bargaining power over privatizers with the two-zone
system; second, the arrangement allowed the government to monitor and
compare the winning consortia's management styles; and third, if one




Four concessionaires bid for each zone of Manila. In the east zone, the
winning consortium was Manila Water-a joint venture212 consisting of Ayala,
a Philippines conglomerate; 2 13 United Utilities, a U.K. corporation; 214 and
Bechtel, the U.S. corporation that was heavily involved in the Cochabamba
privatization. 215 Manila Water's winning bid, however, was "extremely
205. See infra Table 1.
206. See Wu & Malaluan, supra note 3, at 213.
207. McIntosh & Yfiiguez, supra note 204, at 3 tbl.1.
208. An Act to Address the National Water Crisis and for Other Purposes, Rep. Act No. 8041,
§ 6, O.G. p. 1, 3 (June 7, 1995) (Phil.).
209. Wu & Malaluan, supra note 3, at 213.
210. Id.
211. Int'l Finance Corp., supra note 203, at 2.
212. Wu & Malaluan, supra note 3, at 215.
213. About Ayala, AYALA CORP., http://www.ayala.com.ph/about-us (last visited Dec. 4,
2014).
214. Business Overview, UNITED UTILS., http://corporate.unitedutilities.com/united-utilities
-business.aspx (last visited Dec. 4, 2014).
215. See supra text accompanying notes 65; see generally Bechtel Fact Sheet, supra note 72
(noting Bechtel's involvement in the Cochabamba privatization). Since Bechtel was a seasoned
privatizer, its involvement in both the Cochabamba and Manila privatizations may give credence to the
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low." 2 16 In fact, Mark Dumol, a Philippine government official involved with
the privatization, thought the Manila Water bid "looked like a mistake... [and]
was the discount" over MWSS's water rates, not the actual water rate.217
Nevertheless, the government accepted Manila Water's bid after double-
218checking the bid's accuracy, 8 believing that the private sector's low bid
confirmed MWSS's inefficiency.2 19
The Philippine government granted Manila Water the concession for
twenty-five years. 22' According to the terms of the concession, Manila Water
was required to increase the east zone's water coverage from sixty-seven
percent to eighty-five percent in 2001. By 2006, Manila Water was expected to
221deliver coverage to ninety-six percent of the population. Manila Water paid
US$1.2 billion to operate MWSS's water system and was required to service
the existing debts of MWSS.2 22 Furthermore, Manila Water was responsible for
funding the MWSS Regulatory Office, the regulatory authority involved in the
privatization.
223
Under the terms of the concession, Manila Water could only increase
water rates under three scenarios: (1) inflation, (2) unforeseen circumstances,
224and (3) rate rebasing. To determine the rate of inflation, the Philippine
government used an adjusted version of the Retail Price Index (RP!),
accounting for efficiency gains (X) and investment costs (1): RPI - (X- y).225
Unforeseen circumstances included force majeure events, such as currency
devaluation or a sudden change in regulations. 226 Lastly, rate rebasing was a
process by which the government could ensure that Manila Water's rate on
investment met but did not grossly exceed a rate of fair return. 227 The
Philippine government calculated a "rate of fair return" using the rate of return
for comparable infrastructure projects; the comparable rate would be adjusted
to reflect the cost of equity for utility businesses in the Philippines and country
and exchange rate risks. 228 According to the concession agreement, the
government could engage in rate rebasing every five years, with two
exceptions. 229 First, the government could unilaterally cancel the initial rate
argument that even experienced privatizers may not succeed if the policy prescriptions discussed in Part
V are not applied.
216. Wu & Malaluan, supra note 3, at 215.
217. Mark Dumol, The Manila Water Concession: A Key Government Official's Diary of the
Largest Water Privatization, WORLD BANK GRouP 97 (July 2000), http://web.mit.edu/urbanupgrading
/waterandsanitation/resources/pdf-files/ManilaConcession.pdf.
218. Id. at 98.
219. Wu & Malaluan, supra note 3, at 215.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Seeid. at 215, 226.
223. Id. at 215.
224. Id. For a definition of rate rebasing, see infra text accompanying notes 227-230.
225. Dumol, supra note 217, at 52-53.
226. Wu & Malaluan, supra note 3, at 215.
227. Id.
228. Dumol, supra note 217, at 54.
229. Id. at 52.
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rebasing, preventing consortia from entering "extremely low" bids.23 ° Second,
to ensure that the winning consortium's rates of return were not
unconscionably high before the first round of rate rebasing, the government
required each bidder to reveal the discount rate used in the consortium's
financial projections.2 31
3. The Aftermath
Immediately after the deal closed, Manila Water decreased water rates by
roughly seventy-four percent throughout Manila's east zone. 232 In 1997,
however, the Asian Financial Crisis caused a sharp devaluation of the
Philippine peso, and consequently, MWSS's dollar-denominated debt
doubled.233 Citing force majeure, the consortium increased water prices in
1999.234 From 1997 to 2008, rates increased by over one thousand percent,
235
but through a program called "Water for the Community," residents in the
poorest neighborhoods paid below what MWSS charged its customer base.
2 36
Manila Water missed several preliminary targets, but successfully
reduced its non-revenue water usage, a source of inefficiency for utility
companies.237 By 1999, Manila Water delivered profits, and in 2005, it was the
first company listed on the Philippine stock exchange after the Asian Financial
Crisis. 2 3 8 Manila Water's customer base doubled, and by 2006, ninety-ninepercent of Manila Water's customer base had twenty-four hour water access.23 9
230. Id. at 46; Wu & Malaluan, supra note 3, at 215. If a consortium entered extremely low
bids and the government decided to forego the first round of rate rebasing, the consortium would face
ten years of negative cash flow. Dumol, supra note 217, at 46.
231. Dumol, supra note 217, at 53-54.
232. Recalibrating the Meter: A Ten-Year Overview of the MWSS Privatization Deal,
FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION 28 (Mar. 2009), http://fdc.ph/resources/category/21-monographs
?...61 :recalibrating-the-meter [hereinafter Ten-Year Overview].
233. Wu & Malaluan, supra note 3, at 215.
234. Ten-Year Overview, supra note 232, at 23-24.
235. Id. at 28 tbl.6; see infra Table 2 (quoting Ten-Year Overview, supra note 232, at 28).
236. See Wu & Malaluan, supra note 3, at 222; Int'l Finance Corp., supra note 203, at 2; Ten-
Year Overview, supra note 232, at 28.
237. Wu & Malaluan, supra note 3, at 217; see also Ten-Year Overview, supra note 232, at 30
(comparing Manila's nonrevenue water usage versus internal projections). Non-revenue water, a marker
of inefficiency, is "the difference between water production and total metered sales." Benedykt
Dziegielewski & Jack C. Kieffer, Appropriate Design and Evaluation of Water Use and Conservation
Metrics and Benchmarks, 102 AM. WATER WORKS ASS'N J. 1, 1 (2010).
238. Wu & Malaluan, supra note 3, at 217; see also infra Table 3 (listing Manila Water's
profits and profit margins).
239. Int'l Finance Corp., supra note 203, at 2.
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Table 2: Manila Water Company's Rates 240
3
Period / Year Average water rate per m(in Philippine pesos)
Pre-privatization 8.78
Bid rate (1997-1998) 2.32
1999 (First increase) 2.61
2002 (Rate Rebasing) 14.22
2005 (IPO year) 18.55
2008 26.98
Table 3: Manila Water Profits and Profit Margins
241
All monetary figures are denominated in thousand Philippine pesos)
Year Revenue Profit/Loss Profit Margin
1997 421,412 -38,008 -9.02%
1998 989,935 -67,000 -6.77%
1999 1,309,533 101,000 7.71%
2002 (Rate rebasing) 2,682,694 553,380 20.63%
2005 (IPO year) 5,763,102 2,011,521 34.90%
2008242 8,913,590 2,788,067 31.28%
2012243 14,533,068 5,451,306 37.51%
C. The Model Applied
1. Class Dynamics
In the Philippines, wealth is concentrated in relatively few hands. For
example, Ayala, which held the majority stake in Manila Water,244 is one of
three large family conglomerates in the Philippines. 245 Ten families control
more than fifty percent of all publicly held companies' market capitalization. 246
Nevertheless, the privatization delivered Pareto improvements for two crucial
reasons: (1) the Philippine government privatized before overcrowding in
Manila became a severe problem; and (2) Manila Water used a two-tiered
pricing scheme, whereby wealthy consumers subsidized poor consumers' water
rates, thus reducing poor consumers' financial incentives to boycott the
privatization.
240. Ten-Year Overview, supra note 232, at 28.
241. Id. at38.
242. MANILA WATER Co., 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 70 (2009).
243. MANILA WATER CO., 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 72 (2013).
244. Ten-Year Overview, supra note 232, at 17.
245. Wu & Malaluan, supra note 3, at 217.
246. Wu Xun, Political Institutions and Corporate Governance Reform in Southeast Asia, in
REFORMING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND
REGULATIONS 16, 22 (Ho Khai Leong ed., 2005).
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First, unlike the Aguas del Tunari privatization in Cochabamba,2 47 Manila
Water was privatized before Manila reached unsustainable population levels.
The Philippine government passed the Water Crisis Act after reviewing several
reports that rural Filipinos were migrating to certain parts of Manila. 248 To
alleviate inadequate water coverage in these areas, the Philippine government
249
mandated specific coverage targets in the Manila Water concession.
Second, Manila Water introduced a progressive revenue scheme to reduce
the inherent tension between providing services to the poorest neighborhoods
and maintaining profitable operations. As of 2010, Manila Water's poorest
250customers paid rates below the pre-privatization rate, 8.78 Philippine
pesos/m 3 . 251 Through progressive pricing, Manila Water could serve 1.6
25225
million poor customers, and still deliver increasing profits to shareholders. 3
Manila Water also implemented a program called "Water for the Community,"
which enabled the consortium to reach low-income areas of Manila; experts
suggest the program made the poorest Manila residents Manila Water's
"political allies. 254
Because of the consortium's progressive pricing scheme, however, one
could argue that Manila Water's privatization benefitted the poor at the
expense of the wealthy. This argument, however, is undermined because
Manila Water became a publicly listed company, primarily benefitting wealthy
255Filipinos. Ayala, for example, was the primary beneficiary of Manila
Water's initial public offering (IPO).2 56 Furthermore, the consortium increased
water coverage throughout Manila; by 2006, Manila Water's coverage in the
257
east zone was on par with other Southeast Asian cities' water coverage.
2. Business and Deal Structure
a. Corporate Governance Initiatives
Through its initial initiatives, Manila Water minimized the amount of
internal corruption that could plague the consortium. Although Ayala did not
have any "technical experience in operating urban water systems," all of
Manila Water's contractors were hired based on expertise, not nepotism. 258
Moreover, even though Manila Water missed preliminary targets set by the
247. See supra text accompanying notes 49-54.
248. Int'l Finance Corp., supra note 203, at 2.
249. Wu & Malaluan, supra note 3, at 215.
250. Int'l Finance Corp., supra note 203, at 2.
251. Ten-Year Overview, supra note 232, at 28.
252. Int'l Finance Corp., supra note 203, at 2.
253. See supra Table 3.
254. Wu & Malaluan, supra note 3, at 223.
255. See id. at 217 (noting that two family conglomerates, which control a substantial portion
of the Philippines' total market capitalization, profited from Manila Water's success).
256. See id
257. See Int'l Finance Corp., supra note 203, at 2; supra Table 1.
258. Wu & Malaluan, supra note 3, at 217-18.
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concession agreement, the consortium directed its initial efforts toward
reducing internal inefficiencies. 259 For example, the consortium's use of non-
revenue water steadily declined, trailing behind internal projections of
nonrevenue water usage. 26 Similarly, instead of incurring additional human
resources costs, Manila Water retained and retrained MWSS's employees.
Most of Manila Water's midlevel and senior managers were MWSS
employees; consortium executives only held a few managerial positions.
261
Manila Water's corporate governance initiatives ultimately won the company
outside recognition; in 2005, the year of Manila Water's IPO, Asia Money
voted Manila Water the "best managed small cap company.,
262
b. Water Rates and Bargaining Power
Although Manila Water's water rates increased over a thousand percent
from 1997 to 2008, the Philippine government took adequate measures to
ensure that the consortium could not raise rates impulsively.263 As noted above,
according to the terms of the concession agreement, Manila Water could only
raise rates in three circumstances: inflation, force majeure, and rate rebasing. 264
Most importantly, the Philippine government evaluated Manila Water's
financial projections before allowing the consortium to participate in the
bidding process.265 These actions enabled the Philippine government to act as a
de facto agent for Manila residents during and after the negotiation process.
Although these practices appear to be anti-capitalist, nonintervention
would have been fatal to privatizers. For example, in Bolivia, the government's
laissez-faire policies led to populist riots and massive financial losses for
Bechtel. Given the vast wealth disparity in the Philippines, unilaterally
allowing a conglomerate like Ayala to price water would have been likely to
spark a similar uprising among Manila's poor, potentially resulting in losses for
Manila Water. Therefore, the government's intermediation was necessary for
the consortium's long-term stability and success.
3. Political Climate
Instead of appointing a regulator, the Philippine government decided to
take a hybrid approach. The government set up a regulatory authority-the
MWSS Regulatory Office-through the concession agreement, but the
266
consortium was responsible for funding the regulator. Thus, the regulatory
authority was affiliated with both parties to the transaction and depended on
259. Id. at 220.
260. See Ten-Year Overview, supra note 232, at 30.
261. Wu & Malaluan, supra note 3, at 221.
262. Awards, MANILA WATER, http://www.manilawater.com/Pages/Awards.aspx (last visited
Dec 4, 2014).
263. See supra Table 2.
264. See supra text accompanying notes 224-233.
265. Dumol, supra note 217, at 53-54.
266. Wu & Malaluan, supra note 3, at 215.
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both to function; without the privatizer's funds, the authority could not meet its
expenses, but without the government's authority, the regulator would not have
any legal standing.
Even though governments and privatizers have been imperfect regulators
in other privatizations,267 the hybrid approach worked well in the Philippines
for two reasons. First, the Philippine government was genuinely interested in
consumer protection throughout the privatization; an elaborate system of price
control governed the consortium, and the government privatized Manila's
water system to deliver superior services to Manila residents, especially the
urban poor. Today, the MWSS Regulatory Office continues to meet the
government's goals by testing Manila's water quality, overseeing rate rebasing,
and monitoring Manila Water's concession. Second, much like regulatory
agencies in the developed world, the MWSS Regulatory Office is governed by
rather strict laws. For example, the regulator has strict transparency
requirements, which include maintaining a publicly accessible website,
maintaining audited financial statements, and enforcing a strict no-gift
policy. 269 Therefore, the MWSS Regulatory Office resembles a regulatory
agency in the developed world, not the developing world. The hybrid origins
and authorities governing the MWSS Regulatory Office enabled the regulator
to become a positive force in the Manila water privatization. However, as I will
explain in the next Part, the Philippine approach may not work for other
countries, especially those countries that are forced by the World Bank to
privatize.
V. AN OVERVIEW OF WATER PRIVATIZATION POLICIES
Although the previous Parts discussed the specifics of three privatization
programs, this Part will (1) synthesize various government and business
policies adopted in each privatization and (2) offer policy prescriptions for
future water privatizations.
A. Class Dynamics
Class is entrenched in Bolivia, South Africa, and the Philippines.
Nevertheless, the Philippine government and the consortium diluted potential
class differences in the Manila Water privatization by introducing three
moderating devices: (1) graduated rate increases, (2) progressive pricing
schemes, and (3) poverty alleviation programs. If adopted by other countries,
these three policies can mitigate class conflicts, assuaging populist fears that
water privatization will harm the least well off in society.
267. See supra Subsection II.C.3 (Cochabamba); supra Subsection III.C.3 (KwaZulu-Natal).
268. See METRO. WATERWORKS & SEWERAGE SYS. REG. OFF., http://ro.mwss.gov.ph (last
visited Dec. 4, 2014).
269. See Code of Corporate Governance for GOCCs, METRO. WATERWORKS & SEWERAGE
SYs. REG. OFF., http://ro.mwss.gov.ph/?pageid=1499 (last visited Dec. 4, 2014).
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1. Graduated Rate Increases
The Manila Water privatization was not a one-stage process. Unlike rates
in KwaZulu-Natal or Cochabamba, rates in Manila did not rise overnight;
instead, the Philippine government implemented a multistage privatization
process. Rates rose one year prior to the privatization. Since MWSS was
operating Manila' water system at the time, the increase allowed the
government to simulate the worst possible outcome of the privatization-
higher water rates and substandard service.27°
The Philippine government continued to maintain graduated rate
increases throughout the privatization. Manila Water's rates fluctuated in
271response to economic and political shocks or planned timetables. Ultimately,
such carefully planned rate increases enabled the privatization to win support
from Manila's residents and legitimized Manila Water's business practices. By
contrast, in South Africa, sudden rate increases decreased Siza's legitimacy
among South Africans. 272 Similarly, in Bolivia, Bechtel lost its legitimacy and
support after it suddenly introduced high water rates in Cochabamba. 273 The
lack of legitimacy continued to haunt Bechtel after it left Cochabamba-
several human rights groups campaigned against the privatizer in arbitration
proceedings .274
Graduated rate increases, therefore, are a useful policy tool for
consumers, privatizers, and governments. If governments increase rates before
the privatization, such increases may allow a government to sample public
sentiment before signing a legally binding concession agreement. Furthermore,
if pre-privatization rates are high enough, the incoming consortium can lower
rates, instantly winning citizens' approval. Hence, pre-privatization rate
increases can dilute populist backlash to privatization. Although some may
argue that such a strategy may backfire-citizens may believe that the
government and privatizer are attempting to deceive them into accepting the
privatization's legitimacy-rate increases convinced Manila residents that the
privatizers' rates would be lower than the government's rates. 275
Second, graduated rate increases can bring transparency to the
privatizer's pricing process. For example, rates that increase in tandem with
economic shocks are less likely to alarm consumers because economic shocks
affect all sectors of the economy, not just privatized water companies.276
Consumers will likewise anticipate rates that increase on a fixed schedule.
Thus, by virtue of carefully orchestrated rate increases, consumers are less
270. See supra text accompanying note 209.
271. See supra Subsection IV.B.3.
272. See supra Section III.C.
273. See supra Subsection ll.B.3.
274. See Victory over Bechtel, supra note 91.
275. See Dumol, supra note 217, at 43.
276. Adam Rose & Shu-Yi Liao, Modeling Regional Economic Resilience to Disasters: A
Computable General Equilibrium Analysis of Water Service Disruptions, 45 J. REGIONAL ScI. 75, 83
(2005).
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likely to believe that the consortium's pricing is arbitrarily determined.
Privatizers, in turn, experience more certainty and stability through
graduated rate increases. Because consumers are more likely to accept
graduated increases rather than unplanned increases, privatizers can use a
narrower range of revenue projections, thereby reducing uncertainty and risk. A
narrower range of projections can decrease the privatizer's volatility and
increase the privatizer's financial standing among investors and creditors.
277
2. Progressive Pricing Schemes
In contrast to Siza, which charged South African consumers prohibitively
278high rates, Manila Water adopted a progressive pricing scheme. Under the
Manila pricing scheme, the poorest residents paid below the pre-privatization
rate: 8.78 Philippine pesos/m3 .279
Progressive pricing schemes primarily benefit poor consumers, but they
also create positive externalities for governments and privatizers. The Manila
pricing scheme introduces poor consumers to a market-based system, thereby
increasing their loyalty to the free market 28° and enabling governments to
conduct future privatizations without inciting popular resistance. Moreover, the
scheme allows privatizers-in this case, Manila Water-to monetize all
socioeconomic segments of its customer base. In doing so, privatizers make the
poor their political ally, sacrificing revenue in the short run for popular support
in the long-run.2 8'
To execute a progressive pricing scheme, however, privatizers must
charge another subgroup more for water.2 82 Although charging certain groups
more seems like a drawback, static pricing-the opposite of progressive
pricing-actually decreases consumer welfare.283 In the developing world,
where the poor vastly outnumber the rich, static pricing may also lead to
backlash against privatization.284 Consequently, from a cost-benefit analysis
standpoint, progressive pricing yields more benefits than costs.
3. Poverty Alleviation Programs
Poverty alleviation programs deliver water to the "extremely poor,' 285
enabling the community to "play crucial roles in management, billing,
277. See Joshua Aizenman & Nancy Marion, Volatility and Investment: Interpreting Evidence
from Developing Countries, 66 ECONOMICA 157, 158 (1999).
278. See supra text accompanying notes 175-180.
279. See supra Table 2.
280. See Wu & Malaluan, supra note 3, at 223.
281. Id.
282. See supra Section IV.B; supra Table 2.
283. See Ron Baiman, Why Equity Cannot Be Separated from Efficiency: The Welfare
Economics of Progressive Social Pricing, 33 J. RADICAL POL. ECON. 203, 211 (2001).
284. See supra Section n.C.
285. Who Are the Extremely Poor?, WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/video
/2013/06/20/who-are-the-extremely-poor (last visited Dec. 4, 2014).
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collection, maintenance and monitoring. ' ' 286 As a result, poor consumers no
longer have to spend "several hours a day" collecting water and can devote
their time to more productive tasks. Poverty alleviation programs also promote
sustainability within poor communities, thus allowing privatizers to decrease
287their nonrevenue water usage.
Because water privatization programs aim to equalize a community's
access to water, poverty alleviation programs are crucial. While water
privatization may equalize water access, equal water access does not
automatically increase poor consumers' ability to pay for water under a market-
based system. Therefore, a privatizer must supplement its water privatization
program with a poverty alleviation program. Manila Water did so by launching
the "Water for the Community" program. 288 The program allowed Manila
Water to gain popular support and meet the government's directives under the
concession agreement.
289
Although Manila Water used its poverty alleviation program in
conjunction with progressive pricing, a privatizer may employ both policies
separately, in a two-step process. For example, a privatizer may use a poverty
alleviation program to reach poor consumers and build support for water
privatization within the community. After establishing a relationship with the
community, a privatizer can slowly introduce a progressive pricing scheme.
Privatizers have not used this tactic before, but the infusion of poverty
alleviation programs and progressive pricing can bolster privatization efforts.
290
If a privatizer uses a two-step process, the poverty alleviation program
can be an alternative means of conducting market research. A poverty
alleviation program may also increase poor consumers' loyalty to a privatizer
before the privatizer introduces progressive pricing.
B. Business Structure and Political Oversight
In addition to popular support, internal financials and external regulatory
regimes can influence privatizations. For example, due to increasing costs and
little regulatory oversight, Aguas del Tunari raised rates;291 by contrast, Manila
Water achieved financial and political stability because of government-
mandated cost oversight. 292 Therefore, this Section discusses two policies that
can increase efficiencies in privatizers' business and deal structures: (1)
mandatory due diligence and cost oversight and (2) regulatory oversight. If
adopted by governments and privatizers, these policies can increase the
286. Gerardo C. Ablaza, Creating Ripples in Communities Manila Water's Full Circle
Approach, LEAGUE CORP. FOtUND. (Aug. 3,2010), http://lcf.org.ph/component/mna/view/88.
287. Id.
288. Wu & Malaluan, supra note 3, at 223.
289. Id.
290. Although privatizers have not used poverty alleviation programs followed by progressive
pricing schemes, privatizers have enacted both policies in tandem.
291. See supra text accompanying note 69-75.
292. Wu & Malaluan, supra note 3.
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likelihood of a privatization's financial and political stability.
1. Mandatory Due Diligence
Even though due diligence is a common practice in other business
transactions,293 Siza did not perform any due diligence in the KwaZulu-Natal
privatization, thereby incurring massive costs. 294 By contrast, the Philippine
government required Manila Water to reveal its anticipated costs and financial
projections before the consortium was allowed to bid.295 The Philippine
government's oversight compelled the consortium to analyze its costs and
charge consumers reasonable rates for water.
Thus, to curtail unanticipated and excessive costs, governments should
require privatizers to engage in requisite due diligence, submit their due
diligence findings to the government, and submit their financial projections to
the government. These three steps should occur before the bidding process
starts. Governments can utilize financial projections and due diligence in the
drafting process. For example, through transparent due diligence records, the
government and privatizer can allocate associated risks in the concession
agreement. Moreover, in the current age of transparency, governments can also
release due diligence and cost projections to the public to increase consumers'
knowledge of the transaction.
Privatizers may also prefer stringent oversight for three reasons. First,
mandatory and transparent due diligence will enable prospective privatizers to
quantify risk appropriately before the bidding process starts. Second, an
accurate measure of risk-either captured by the company's weighted average
cost of capital or accurate financial projections-will reduce uncertainty and
volatility. In return, the privatizer will obtain cheaper access to credit from
296banks and other financial institutions. Third, because a lack of due diligence
has harmed privatizers in the past,297 mandatory due diligence may function as
an insurance policy for prospective privatizers.
Although these reasons may incentivize any privatizer to conduct due
diligence, privatizers such as Siza are not as stringent in conducting due
diligence for two reasons. First, the government may incentivize the privatizer
to proceed without sufficient due diligence through its economic policies. For
example, KwaZulu-Natal implemented the policy of "total cost recovery,"
reassuring privatizers that they would be able to recapture whatever costs they
incurred during the course of privatization. 298 Second, given development
293. See Duncan Angwin, Mergers and Acquisitions Across European Borders: National
Perspectives on Preacquisition Due Diligence and the Use of Professional Advisers, 36 J. WORLD Bus.
32, 33 (2001).
294. See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 140, at 206, 212.
295. Dumol, supra note 217, at 53-54.
296. Aizenman & Marion, supra note 277, at 173.
297. See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 140, at 212.
298. See supra Subsection LI.C.2.
2015]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
299banks' lump sum funding structure, governments and privatizers may beconcerned with short-term profits rather than long-term financial success.
2. Regulatory Oversight
In the three privatizations discussed above, each respective government
adopted radically different regulatory regimes. Bolivia vested its regulatory
authority in an official regulatory agency, but the agency had no power to
negotiate on behalf of Cochabamba's residents.300 South Africa experimented
with federalism, transferring federal authority to local governments.3 °1 The
Philippines, however, chose a hybrid model: the privatizer derived its authority
from the government, but was funded by the privatizer.30 2 The Philippines was
the most successful, but strict laws similar to those found in the developed
world governed its regulatory regime.
303
Regardless of the Philippines's success, scholars have found that state-
sponsored regulatory authorities are ineffectual in monitoring privatizations.
304
In particular, Loftus and McDonald note that in the developing world, when a
government-appointed regulator oversees water privatizations, the regulator
may be reduced to a government or an industry puppet, unable to safeguard
consumers' interests in the privatization. 305 For example, in a water
privatization in Buenos Aires, the government renegotiated a concession
agreement without seeking input from the government-appointed regulatory
agency. In fact, the regulatory agency was rarely consulted in several
concession-related matters, rendering the agency incapable of protecting
consumers' interests.
306
Third-party funding also exacerbates the principal-agent problem
307between governments and citizens. Development banks often incentivize
governments to privatize. 308 Although solutions outlined in Subsection V.B.1
can partially eliminate the underlying principal-agent problem, only a robust
regulator can ensure that consumers' interests are represented throughout the
duration of a concession.
Nevertheless, third-party funding can be restructured in a way that
mimics regulatory oversight. Development banks currently award lump sum
299. See infra text accompanying note 309.
300. See supra Subsection II.C.3.
301. See supra Subsection nI.C.3.
302. See supra Subsection IV.C.3.
303. Code of Corporate Governance for GOCCs, supra note 269 (transparency policy).
304. See, e.g., Girishankar & De Silva, supra note 23, at 10-11.
305. Loftus & McDonald, supra note 19, at 187-88.
306. Id. at 198.
307. In the context of this Note, the principal-agent problem refers to the inability of an agent
to monitor the principal's conduct in a situation in which the agent "has an informational advantage over
the principal and takes actions that impact both [parties]." Gary J. Miller, The Political Evolution of
Principal-Agent Models, 8 ANN. REV. POL. SCi. 203, 203 (2005).
308. See Sinchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 58, at 1748-49.
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payments for a signed concession agreement.30 9 Instead of tying funding to a
signed agreement, development banks should tie funding to a privatization's
success, thus imposing checks on the privatizer and the government. Through
this arrangement, each tranche of funding can be tied to the achievement of
certain milestones-for instance, increased coverage, strong financials, or
poverty alleviation. Such an arrangement would function like a social impact
bond, a popular development tool recently used in developed countries.
3 0
By tying funding to specific goals-known as impact funding-the
World Bank and its peers can monitor privatizations across multiple metrics (or
milestones). The metrics, of course, should be customized for every country-
metrics for South African privatizations, for instance, may have stressed
positive public health outcomes, while the metrics for Bolivia may have
emphasized decreasing the number of populist uprisings. Moreover, the World
Bank can select metrics that underscore long-term efficiency or well being,
thereby conducting a longitudinal analysis of the privatization.
More importantly, impact funding realigns monetary incentives. Instead
of being paid to privatize, governments are paid to privatize well. Because each
tranche of funding is associated with a specific development goal, governments
are compelled to scrutinize bids carefully and draft concession agreements
thoughtfully. After the privatization deal closes, governments are further
incentivized to regulate the winning consortium's operations and evaluate the
consortium's impact on the community. In return, development banks receive a
greater return on investing in underserved communities and developing
countries.
Development banks should take three steps to implement an impact
funding program. First, development banks should carefully study each country
to determine and control potential sources of political or business instability.
Such studies will enable development banks to tailor metrics or milestones to
each country. A proper study of South Africa, for example, would prioritize
public health over popular instability, but a proper study of Bolivia may have
done the opposite. Second, development banks should verify the attainment of
each metric. To do so, banks can either employ field experts to measure each
metric or audit the government's records on each metric. Either option can
reduce government-led fraud or corruption. Third, development banks should
rank each metric in increasing order of difficulty, awarding funding for easy
metrics before more difficult metrics. Such a sequence will motivate
governments to work toward more difficult development goals-for example,
renewing a successful concession agreement.
311
309. See O'Neill, supra note 1, at 362; Peru, supra note 24.
310. MCKINSEY & CO., FROM POTENTIAL TO ACTION: BRINGING SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS TO
THE U.S. (2012), http://mckinseyonsociety.com/downloads/reports/Social-Innovation/McKinseySocia
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CONCLUSION
In water privatization deals, resource allocation is in tension with poverty
alleviation, and political interests often clash with citizens' (or consumers')
interests. This Note discusses three water privatizations-Aguas del Tunari in
Bolivia, Siza in South Africa, and Manila Water in the Philippines-to critique
development banks' privatization policies. Out of these privatizations, only the
latter has successfully diffused the conflict between resource allocation and
poverty alleviation, harmonizing political interests with consumers' interests.
Nevertheless, all three privatizations provide valuable policy prescriptions for
development banks, governments, and future privatizers: for example,
progressive pricing schemes, poverty alleviation programs, shared financial
projections, and impact funding. The first two policies build trust among
consumers. The third policy increases transparency during a privatization. The
fourth policy regulates governments and winning consortia, rewarding
governments for achieving specific development goals. In the past,
governments and privatizers have implemented each of the first three policies
singularly. In the future, however, governments and privatizers should adopt all
three policies in tandem, exploring the implications of political and economic
transparency on resource allocation, poverty, and development.
